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Code under the 
Biological and Toxin 
Weapons 
Convention: 
Engaging the Life 
Science Community 
Malcolm Dando, UK 
Tatyana Novossiolova, Bulgaria 




It is unclear at present how the proposal 
by China and Pakistan for an 
Aspirational (Ethical) Code under the 
BTWC will be taken forward through to 
the 9th Review Conference of the 
Convention in 2022. However, some 
difficult questions will have to be 
addressed for this process to be 
successful in producing a code that can 
then be implemented in more detailed 
codes of conduct and codes of practice in 
national and professional settings after 
the Review Conference. This paper 
addresses one such question: How might 
the Aspirational Code proposed by China 
and Pakistan in 2018 best be modified 




The development of effective approaches and 
mechanisms for the governance of dual-use 
life sciences research – benignly intended 
research which could also be misused for 
hostile purposes, including the development 
of novel biological and toxin weapons – is an 
essential element of strengthening the 
international norm against biological 
weapons enshrined in the 1975 Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Life 
sciences stakeholders, for example in 
academia, industry, or government have a 
fundamental role to play in the governance 
of dual-use life sciences research, not least 
because they are on the frontlines of driving 
innovation. The 2019 Guidelines for 
Responsible Conduct in Veterinary 
Research published by the World Animal 
Health Organisation (OIE) underscore that 
the “responsibility for the identification, 
assessment and management of dual-use 
implications rests to differing degrees across 
many stakeholders throughout the research 
life cycle”: e.g. researchers, institutions, 
grant and contract funders, companies, 
educators, scientific publishers and other 
communicators, and regulatory authorities.1 
Fostering a culture of trust, personal 
responsibility, accountability and 
transparency that champions ethics in the 
workplace is an important prerequisite for 
the development and implementation of 
sustainable approaches and measures for the 
management of dual-use life sciences 
research.2 
The utility of aspirational codes, such as 
codes of ethics and more detailed codes of 
conduct for promoting a shared recognition 
of and compliance with professional norms 
and ethics principles has been observed in 
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different fields of professional practice, for 
example in medicine and biomedical 
research.3 States Parties to BTWC have also 
noted the value of fostering a culture of 
responsibility amongst relevant national life 
sciences professionals and the voluntary 
development, adoption and promulgation of 
codes (of conduct)* with relation to 
strengthening the national implementation 
of the Convention.4 During the current 
BTWC inter sessional meetings, codes and 
biological security education are being 
considered by the BTWC Meeting of Experts 
on Review of Developments in the Field of 
Science and Technology Related to the 
Convention.5 In 2018, China and Pakistan 
tabled a joint proposal for the development 
of a code for biological scientists under the 
BTWC.# This proposal builds upon an earlier 
Working Paper that China submitted in 2015 
ahead of the Eighth Review Conference of 
the BTWC.6 Given the far-reaching 
implications of the COVID-19 global 
pandemic, the importance of engaging life 
sciences stakeholders with the prevention of 
biological threats and the risk of deliberate 
disease is likely to receive considerable 
attention at the 9th Review Conference of the 
BTWC.7 
Exactly how the question of the further 
development of the code will be handled by 
States Parties in the lead up to the Review 
Conference, at the Review Conference and 
during the next inter sessional meetings after 
the Review Conference is not clear at this 
stage. However, some of the difficulties in 
achieving an agreement and getting it 
implemented in more detailed national and 
professional codes of conduct based on the 
aspirational code in diverse national and 
professional settings can be envisaged. One 
such difficulty, given the other pressures 
they experience, will be in getting life 
scientists to accept that the code is both 
relevant to their work and can be practically 
implemented within their concept of 
responsible conduct of research. Hence, it is 
essential to consider practical options for 
maximising the engagement of life science 
stakeholders both with the development and 
the promulgation of the proposed code. 
The aim of this paper is to make suggestions 
about how the proposed China-Pakistan 
code might best be modified in order to be 
as easily acceptable as possible to the life 
science community. The paper is organised 
in the following sections: Section 2 gives a 
brief history of the work on codes for life 
scientists within the meetings of States 
Parties to the BTWC and presents the 
proposed China-Pakistan code; Section 3 
provides an overview of the origins and 
development of the Hague Ethical Guidelines 
for chemists under the CWC; and Section 4 
present a summary and analysis drawn from 
the vast general literature on how codes 
should be developed and implemented. This 
then leads in Section 5 to a comparative 
analysis of the original 2005 Statement on 
Biosecurity by the Inter Academy Panel, the 
Hague Ethical Guidelines and the proposed 
China-Pakistan code in the light of the 
preceding sections; and thus, in conclusion 
in Section 6 to some ideas about how the 
proposed China-Pakistan code might best be 
modified and what practical steps for its 
implementation could be considered. 
2. Codes under the BTWC 
 
The code proposed by China and Pakistan 
was first put forward by China at a BTWC 
meeting in 2015 and was then revised at a 
major international meeting of experts in 
Tianjin China before being put forward again 
in 2018.8 This revised version of the code is 
shown in Table 1. 
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TABLE 1. The Code for Biological Scientists under the Biological Weapons 
Convention Proposed by China and Pakistan in 2018 
 
States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention recommend that biological scientists 
and research institutions shall follow the hereinafter code of conduct when conducting 
bio-science research and other related activities. 
 
1. Ethical standard: Respect human life. Respect the dignity of humanity, and always 
revere life and consciously protect human rights. Respect social ethics, morality and social 
norms and traditions. Consciously maintain a harmonious relationship between humankind 
and the ecological environment. Constantly pay attention to the protection of the ecological 
environment. Consciously abide by legal regulations and standards governing scientific 
research. Refrain from behaviors intentionally or unintentionally ignoring laws and regulations 
and circumventing supervision. 
2. Research integrity: Hold an attitude of rigor and integrity when conducting research. 
When conducting scientific research which is still controversial, researchers and institutions 
should fully consider the potential ethical and moral risks, strive to ensure that all those who 
may be affected benefit directly or indirectly from the research, and try to minimize possible 
hazards of the research. 
 
3. Respect for the object of research: Respect the object of bio-science research, including 
human and non-human organisms. In researches involving the human subject, the legal 
rights and privacy of the human subject shall be fully protected, and his or her right of informed 
consent be guaranteed. 
 
4. Process management for science research: Enhance risk control during the 
formulation and implementation of a bio-science research project. Conduct sufficient 
assessment and feasibility study on the possible threats the research process or outcomes 
may cause to health and society. Establish effective prevention and emergency response 
plans to mitigate relevant risks, and put in place a whole-process oversight mechanism on 
the research projects. 
5. Constraint on the spread of research outcome: Strike a balance between public 
security and the freedom of research and speech. Use accurate and clear language when 
disseminating research outcomes to avoid misunderstanding from the general public. Limit 
or prohibit the dissemination of academic achievements which might be abused by non- 
state actors or pose threats to public health. The academic community shall publicly denounce 
academic misconduct in bio-research. 
 
6. Popularization of science and technology: Attach great importance to 
popularization of biotechnology. Biological scientists have an obligation to educate the general 
public on bio-science and technology. When doing so, they are encouraged to make use of 
modern media and hi-tech means, to introduce both the positive impact and the potential 
risks of the bio-science development in an objective and comprehensive manner, and to 
assuage panic among the general public due to lack of information. Oppose fabrication of 
biotechnology events inconsistent with facts and news hyping. 
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7. Institution’s role: Strengthen oversight of scientific institutions. Institutions shall 
conduct real-time monitoring and periodical assessment of research activities to mitigate 
potential risks and threats. Establish independent risk review committees within the 
institutions composed of scholars from relevant fields. Improve evaluation mechanism on 
publication of bio-science results. 
 
8. Education and training: Scientific community and professional associations should 
play an active role in education and training. Increase public awareness of the Convention, 
and establish a safe education and training system for all parties involved in biotechnology 
research. Biological scientists should be encouraged to engage in dialogue and cooperation 
with social scientists, philosophers and anthropologists, so as to have a better understanding 
of the possible ethical and social implications of relevant biological research and its outcome. 
 
9. Awareness and engagement: Biological scientists should be fully aware of the potential 
threats of dual-use research to human society, ecological environment and economic security. 
It is advocated to promote the peaceful application of biological research achievements, to 
prevent the abuse and misuse of biological products, scientific knowledge, technology and 
equipment, and to consciously resist any unethical scientific conducts that are harmful to 
human society. 
 
10. International exchanges: Actively participate in international cooperation in the field 
of bio-science and technology research. Actively explore models and avenues for sharing bio- 
science achievements. Biological scientists around the world are encouraged to work closely 
for progress and innovation in bio-science and technology through learning from and inspire 
each other, with a view to promote the well-being and health of humankind. 
 
Source: China and Pakistan, 20189 
 
The China-Pakistan code is an important 
initiative that will hopefully encourage 
increased substantive and sustained 
engagement by an ever-growing and more 
diverse number of States through relevant 
BTWC meetings and mechanisms. It builds 
on previous presentations and discussions 
under the BTWC,10 and has also been 
extensively discussed by both BTWC State 
Parties and the broader life science 
community since its first presentation. 
The value of codes of conduct in engaging life 
scientists with biological security issues has 
been recognised by BTWC States Parties. As 
part of the Intersessional Programme of 
Work agreed by the Fifth Review Conference 
of the BTWC, in 2003-2005 States Parties 
to the BTWC considered, inter alia, the topic 
of “content, promulgation, and adoption of 
codes of conduct for scientists”.11 As part of 
the Intersessional Programme of Work 
agreed by the Sixth Review Conference of 
the BTWC, in 2007-2010 States Parties 
considered the topic of “adoption and/or 
development of codes of conduct with the aim 
of preventing misuse in the context of 
advances in bio-science and bio-technology 
research with the potential of use for 
purposes prohibited by the Convention.”12 As 
part of the Intersessional Programme of 
Work agreed by the Seventh Review 
Conference of the BTWC, in 2012-2015 the 
topic of “voluntary codes of conduct and other 
measures to encourage responsible conduct 
by scientists, academia and industry” was 
considered by States Parties under the 
Standing Agenda Item on the “Review of 
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Basic Principles 
Target Group 
Rules of conduct 
Raising awareness 
Research and publication policy 
Accountability and oversight 
Internal and external communication 
Accessibility 
Shipment and transport 
developments in the field of science and 
technology related to the Convention.”13 
During the current Intersessional Process 
2018-2020, States Parties have agreed to 
consider the topic of the “development of a 
voluntary model code of conduct for biological 
scientists and all relevant personnel.”14 
At the 2008 Meeting of Experts, the 
Netherlands presented a Working Paper that 
reported on the development of a national 
code of conduct for biosecurity that had 
been developed by the Royal Netherlands 
Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW).15 
There are two importat features of the 
Netherlands Working Paper 
Table 2: Main Elements of the Netherlands National Code of 
Conduct for Biosecurity 
 
 
Source: Netherlands, 200816 
The first point of importance is that the 
Working Paper carefully distinguished 
between different kinds of codes and their 
functions. This differentiation was set out as 
in Table 3. The Netherlands paper drew this 
differentiation from a paper by the 
Sociologist Professor Brain Rappert.17 
Rappert argued that it was critical to 
 
 
differentiate between these different kinds 
of codes because discussions would become 
impossibly muddled if people were talking 
about different kinds of code. As indicated in 
the Working Paper, the Netherlands national 
code of conduct was “to be seen as a 
contribution to awareness raising”.18 
 
TABLE 3: Types of Codes and their Functions 
 
Type Name Main Aims 
Aspirational codes Code of Ethics Alert; set realistic or idealistic standards 
Educational/Advisory 
codes 
Code of Conduct Provide guidelines, raise awareness & debate; 
foster moral agents 
Enforceable codes Code of Practice Prescribe or proscribe certain acts 
Source: Brian Rappert, 200419 
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1. Awareness. Scientists have the obligation to do no harm. They should always take into 
consideration the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their own activities. They should, 
therefore: 1) always bear in mind the potential consequences - possibly harmful - of their 
research and recognize that individual good conscience does not justify ignoring the possible 
misuse of their scientific endeavour; 2) refuse to undertake research that has only harmful 
consequences for humankind. 
 
2. Safety and Security. Scientists working with agents such as pathogenic organisms or 
dangerous toxins have a responsibility to use good, safe and secure laboratory procedures, 
whether codified by law or by common practice. 
 
3. Education and Information. Scientists should be aware of, disseminate and teach the 
national and international law and regulations, as well as policies and principles aimed at 
preventing the misuse of biological research. 
 
4. Accountability. Scientists who become aware of activities that violate the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention or international customary law should raise their concerns with 
appropriate people, authorities and agencies. 
5. Oversight. Scientists with responsibility for oversight of research or for evaluation of 
projects or publications should promote adherence to these principles by those under their 
control, supervision or evaluation. 
The second feature of interest is that the 
Netherlands code was developed after a 
Statement on Biosecurity that had been 
published by the Inter Academy Panel in 
2005. The Statement which by then had 
been endorsed by 68 National Academies was 
included as an annex to the Working paper 
as shown in Table 4. It is clear that this was 
an Aspirational (Ethical) Code similar to the 
Hippocratic Oath and not a detailed code of 
conduct or code of practice. 
 
TABLE 4: Statement on Biosecurity of the Inter Academy Panel 
 
Source: IAP, 200520 
 
The Netherlands National Code of Conduct 
for Biosecurity itself, for example, was taken 
into account in a Code of Conduct for 
Biological Resource Centres presented by 
the Global Biological Resource Centres 
Network (GBRCN) in an NGO Statement at 
the Seventh Review Conference of the BTWC 
in 2011.21 However, it is quite clear that 
there was not a large-scale implementation 
of such codes derived from the Netherlands 
code and the principles set out and agreed 
by many National Academies. The major 
likely cause of this failure is almost certainly 
the enormous amount of effort that is 
necessary to engage the life science 
community in the process of effectively 
developing and implementing such codes. 
As a Working Paper by Australia put it at 
the 2005 BTWC meeting:22 
 
“Amongst the Australian scientific 
community, there is a low level of 
awareness of the risk of misuse of the 
biological sciences to assist in the 
development of biological or chemical 
weapons. Many scientists working in ‘dual- 
use’ areas simply do not consider the 
possibility that their work could 
inadvertently assist in a biological or 
chemical weapons programme. For most 
of these researchers, biological weapons 
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issues may seem irrelevant and therefore 
strong advocacy is required to overcome 
natural resistance or ignorance…” 
 
Therefore, the Working Paper continued: 
 
“…Introducing Codes of Conduct that 
highlight these issues is an important step 
in raising awareness. However, it is not 
enough simply to put such Codes in place. 
Without effective measures to educate 
scientists about the existence and 
importance of such Codes, attitudes and 
awareness will remain largely 
unchanged.” (Emphasis added) 
 
In drawing these conclusions together 
Australia’s view was based on an extensive 
public awareness and communication 
strategy that it had employed in order to 
impress on the general population and 
scientific community of the importance of its 
quarantine policy to keep the country free 
of foreign species. 
Contemporaneous and subsequent 
initiatives supporting such codes were 
undertaken by a wide range of scientific 
associations and organizations, including the 
American Society of Microbiology, the US 
National Academy of Sciences, the UK Royal 
Society, the International Centre for Genetic 
Engineering and Biotechnology, the 
International Union of Biochemistry and 
Molecular Biology and the International 
Council for the Life Sciences.23 These 
activities have been complemented and 
stimulated by the ICRC as well as the work 
of individual scientists and academics.24 
Further work, prior to and during the 2012- 
2015 BTWC Intersessional Process, to 
develop and promulgate codes for life 
scientists as well as associated policies on for 
example biosecurity, was undertaken in 
different States including Indonesia and 
Malaysia.29 Consideration should also be 
given to the full range of Statements and 
Working Papers submitted by States and 
relevant reports and materials civil society 
scientific associations during or on the 
margins of MSPs and MXs.26 
 
3. The Hague Ethical Guidelines 
under the CWC 
 
In comparison to the time and energy 
expended by a diverse range of organizations 
in the life sciences, the chemical science 
community’s efforts to develop codes were 
(initially at least) more limited and mainly 
focused upon the activities of the 
International Union of Pure and Applied 
Chemistry (IUPAC).27 In 2004, the IUPAC 
President and the Director-General of the 
OPCW agreed on a joint project on chemistry 
education, outreach and the professional 
conduct of chemists. This led to a joint 
IUPAC/OPCW international workshop in 
2005, which concluded that codes were 
needed for all those engaged in science and 
technology using chemicals, so as to “protect 
public health and the environment and to 
ensure that [such] activities … are, and are 
perceived to be, in compliance, with 
international treaties, national laws and 
regulations such as those relating to illicit 
drugs, chemical and biological weapons, 
banned and severely restricted chemicals.”28 
The workshop also concluded that such 
codes were “complementary to national 
implementing legislation for the CWC” and 
would “help to achieve in-depth compliance 
throughout academia, industry, and 
government of those engaged in science and 
technology using chemicals”. They would also 
“extend awareness of the general-purpose 
criteria of both the CWC and the BTWC and 
thus help ensure its effective 
implementation”.  The workshop 
recommended that IUPAC should develop a 
model code of principles as well as draft 
elements for codes that might be 
promulgated to IUPAC national adhering 
authorities (NAOs) and associate national 
adhering authorities (ANAOs), urging them 
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to review any existing codes to ensure these 
elements are included.29 IUPAC and its 
Committee on Chemical Research Applied to 
World Needs (CHEMRAWN) subsequently 
initiated a project to develop such a code.30 
The group tasked with this project 
subsequently concluded that rather than 
drafting a single formal code, it would be 
more effective and persuasive to develop 
guiding principles, that is an Aspirational 
(Ethical) Code, that should then be 
considered by those developing any future 
codes of conduct for specific associations or 
other bodies. This reflected the view that 
codes are more likely to be accepted and 
implemented if they are developed by those 
to whom they will apply, thereby fostering a 
sense of ‘ownership’ amongst practitioners.31 
In December 2014, in his Statement to the 
19th CWC Conference of States Parties 
(CSP), the German Ambassador introduced 
his country’s proposal for a “Hippocratic 
Oath” for chemists. Whilst acknowledging 
the importance of action and responsibility 
by States, he stated: 
 
“In order to free the world entirely of the 
danger of chemical weapons, we also have 
to appeal to the responsibility of 
individuals…who have the capability to 
develop and produce chemical weapons. 
This is the reason why Germany has 
submitted the proposal of a code [of 
conduct] for chemical professionals…. 
Similar to the Hippocratic oath…this 
concise text could lay the moral basis for 
the work of chemical professionals.”32 
 
The Conference formally: 
 
“welcomed the initiative for a text of 
ethical guidelines for chemical 
professionals related to the Convention” it 
further “invited the [OPCW’s Technical] 
Secretariat to inform the Council of its 
efforts for the advancement of the 
initiative and its objectives in close 
collaboration with relevant professional 
and chemical industry organisations”, and 
finally “encouraged States Parties to 
discuss the matter further.”33 (bold 
highlighting as original) 
 
The German government subsequently 
provided dedicated funding for two 
workshops held in 2015 to explore these 
issues and develop an ethical guidelines 
text.34 This project was supported and 
organised under the auspices of the Scientific 
Advisory Board of the OPCW; and the work 
was undertaken by an independent 
international group of scientists from the 
chemical industry and academia in 24 
countries and from all world regions. This 
participatory approach of reaching an 
agreement could usefully be applied in the 
further development of a code under the 
BTWC. The independent group worked “to 
define and harmonize key elements of ethical 
guidelines as they relate to chemical weapons 
based on existing codes.” 35 As part of this 
process, the group and the Technical 
Secretariat of the OPCW compiled and 
analysed a non-exhaustive collection of codes 
of ethics and conduct (and related 
guidelines).36 
The resulting Hague Ethical Guidelines, 
echoing previous IUPAC thinking, are a set 
of principles — an Aspirational (Ethical) Code 
— that can be used to support both the 
development of new codes, and also to review 
existing codes, in order to ensure they align 
with the provisions of the CWC. The drafters 
note that “A code need not mention chemical 
weapons or the CWC to support its basic 
goals, and provisions may need to be tailored 
for particular sectors or circumstances, while 
still reflecting the fundamental values.”37 
However, it should also be noted that whilst 
this referred to the range of codes informed 
by the guidelines, the introductory 
paragraphs contained in both the Hague 
Guidelines Brochure and the relevant 
promotional pages of the OPCW website 
clearly situate the guidelines as measures to 
promote adherence to the CWC. 
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The Hague Ethical Guidelines have 
subsequently been disseminated widely to 
professional societies, academia and industry 
organisations throughout the world. They 
have been endorsed by IUPAC and the 
International Council of Chemical 
Associations (ICCA).38 Furthermore, in April 
2016, the American Chemical Society (ACS) 
gathered 30 scientists from 18 countries for 
a workshop in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia to 
collaboratively draft an actionable Global 
Chemists’ Code of Ethics (GCCE), which was 
guided in part by The Hague Ethical 
Guidelines. This process was coordinated 
with assistance and support from the U.S. 
Department of State’s Chemical Security 
Program (CSP) and Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory (PNNL). 39 
 
The Hague Ethical Guideline as shown on 
the OPCW website are listed in Table 5. It 
should be noted that the OPCW continues to 
promote and promulgate these guidelines, 
particularly through the work of the 
Advisory Board on Education and Outreach 
(ABEO). 
 
TABLE 5: The Hague Ethical Guidelines 
The Key Elements 
Achievements in the field of chemistry should be used to benefit humankind and protect the 
environment. 
1. Sustainability 
Chemistry practitioners have a special responsibility for promoting and achieving 
the UN Sustainable Development Goals of meeting the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
2. Education 
Formal and informal educational providers, enterprise, industry and civil society should 
cooperate to equip anybody working in chemistry and others with the necessary knowledge 
and tools to take responsibility for the benefit of humankind, the protection of the environment 
and to ensure relevant and meaningful engagement with the general public. 
3. Awareness and Engagement 
Teachers, chemistry practitioners, and policymakers should be aware of the multiple uses of 
chemicals, specifically their use as chemical weapons or their precursors. They should promote 
the peaceful applications of chemicals and work to prevent any misuse of chemicals, scientific 
knowledge, tools and technologies, and any harmful or unethical developments in research 
and innovation. They should disseminate relevant information about national and international 
laws, regulations, policies and practices. 
4. Ethics 
To adequately respond to societal challenges, education, research and innovation must respect 
fundamental rights and apply the highest ethical standards. Ethics should be perceived as a 
way of ensuring high-quality results in science. 
5. Safety and Security 
Chemistry practitioners should promote the beneficial applications, uses, and development of 
science and technology while encouraging and maintaining a strong culture of safety, health, 
and security. 
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Source: OPCW, 201540 
 
 
4. Key Considerations in the 
Development and Implementation of 
Codes 
 
Codes of conduct and codes of ethics are 
essential elements of professional culture, as 
they outline a set of shared principles and 
norms that practitioners agree to abide by. 
These principles and norms reflect both the 
way a given profession has evolved and the 
way it related to its broader social milieu. By 
design, codes of conduct and codes of ethics 
are self-governance instruments that enable 
practitioners in different domains to 
maintain a certain degree of autonomy in 
their affairs and preserve the integrity of 
their professional culture.41 Hence, the 
processes of developing and amending 
existing codes of conduct and codes of ethics 
are deliberative processes that primarily 
involve representatives of the respective 
professional domain. It follows from here 
that the process of developing an Aspirational 
(Ethical) Code of Conduct for Life Scientists 
within the framework of the BTWC should 
ensure the active engagement of life science 
stakeholders in academia, industry, and 
government. As life science, stakeholders will 
also be the ones directly involved in the 
implementation of the code, so it is vital that 
they take ownership of the development 
process and view the code as an integral 
element of their professional practice. 
 
As regards the practical development of 
codes, there is a vast literature devoted to 
the questions of how these should be 
developed and implemented. We do not need 
to go into great detail here as it was done 
thoroughly by the OPCW in its work on the 
Hague Ethical Guidelines. However, in the 
presentations by the OPCW’s Scientific 
Advisory Board to the BTWC, the 
importance of the resources available in the 
Ethics Codes Collection at the Illinois 
Institute of Technology was acknowledged.42 
This contains, for example, a guide to 
developing an effective code of conduct with 
a list of 15 points that need to be checked.43 
We have extracted some of the points to be 
checked that seem to be most relevant here 
in Table 6. 
6. Accountability 
Chemistry practitioners have a responsibility to ensure that chemicals, equipment and facilities 
are protected against theft and diversion and are not used for illegal, harmful or destructive 
purposes. These persons should be aware of applicable laws and regulations governing the 
manufacture and use of chemicals, and they should report any misuse of chemicals, scientific 
knowledge, equipment and facilities to the relevant authorities. 
7. Oversight 
Chemistry practitioners who supervise others have the additional responsibility to ensure 
that chemicals, equipment and facilities are not used by those persons for illegal, harmful or 
destructive purposes. 
 
8. Exchange of InformationChemistry practitioners should promote the exchange of scientific 
and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry for peaceful 
purposes. 
13 Jan-Jun 2021  
TABLE 6: Best Practices Checklist for Developing an Effective Code of 
Conduct 
 
 Are the code’s provisions in line with the goals of the organization’s overall ethics 
program? 
 
 Does the code use clear, concise language that can be easily understood by employees 
at all levels of the organization? 
 
 Does the code adequately address all areas that impact the organization, particularly 
those areas that offer the highest potential for risk? 
 
 Are appropriate training methods being used, both during the code implementation 
phase as well as on an ongoing basis? 
 
 Does the code include a decision tree or similar mechanism to guide employees when 
faced with an ethical dilemma? 
 
 Does the code include relevant examples, case studies, or real-world scenarios that 
employees typically face on a daily basis? 
 
 Is top leadership on board with the code development process, and has it been consulted 
as the process unfolds? 
 
 Has input been sought from employees and stakeholders during the information 
gathering process? 
 
Source: Lighthouse, 201344 
 
The collection of material on the Illinois 
website also includes a long article devoted 
entirely to the question of how to write a 
code.45 One particular section asks what 
should be said about each element (termed 
a standard) in the code. These requirements 
are set out in Table 7. 
 
TABLE 7: Key Components for each Element of the Code 
 
 
Source: Martens, 200546 
 
It may appear that this is too detailed for an 
Aspirational (Ethical) Code but the general 
point stands: it is necessary to have a very 
clear idea of what is stated about each 
 
 
element of the code and why it is stated. This 
is particularly relevant here as it is clearly 
not easy to communicate ethical and security 
issues to practicing life scientists. 
1. Provide a rationale to explain the need for the element. 
2. Provide a clear definition of the element. 
3. Provide clear guidance through examples so that people understand their responsibilities. 
4. Discuss additional resources for information. 
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5. Comparison of the IAP Statement, 
the Hague Ethical Guidelines and the 
Proposed Code 
 
Despite the differences in the issues 
addressed and the methodologies employed, 
it is useful for our purposes to compare the 
elements in these three Aspirational (Ethical) 
Codes: the proposed China-Pakistan code 
under the BTWC (Table 1); the IAP 
Statement on Biosecurity (Table 4); and the 
Hague Ethical Guidelines under the CWC 
(Table 5), and to investigate where and why 
they are similar or different. 
 
5.1 The Elements of the Code and their 
ordering 
 
On the OPCW website, the Hague Ethical 
Guidelines are contextualised by an 
introductory text setting out their nature 
and purpose i.e. “a set of ethical guidelines 
informed by the Chemical Weapons 
Convention”, intended “to promote a culture 
of responsible conduct in the chemical 
sciences and to guard against the misuse of 
chemistry”, whilst a more extensive 
introduction is provided in the OPCW’s 
Hague Guideline Brochure.47 The framing on 
the website is reminiscent of the introduction 
to the 2008 Netherlands national code of 
conduct which began by stating that: 
 
“The aim of this Code of Conduct is to 
prevent life sciences research or its 
application from directly or indirectly 
contributing to the development, 
production or stockpiling of biological 
weapons, as described in the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), or 
to any other misuse of biological agents 
and toxins.”48 
 
An analogous approach would also seem to 
be sensible for an Aspirational (Ethical) Code 
as it meets the need of ensuring that the 
objective of having the code is clearly 
understood from the very outset without 
having to have a separate justification in each 
element of the code. 
It should also be noted that the elements of 
the Hague Ethical Guidelines are directly 
focused on the chemical practitioner and 
what he or she should do. By contrast, the 
elements of the proposed code under the 
BTWC frequently do not focus directly on the 
life science practitioner. Indeed, after a long 
paragraph of introduction, the elements are 
clearly stated to be aimed at “biological 
scientists and research institutions” in a 
short paragraph immediately prior to the 
elements. For comparison under the Hague 
Ethical Guidelines “chemical practitioners” 
are mentioned in elements 1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8; 
and additionally, “education providers” (i.e., 
chemists) are mentioned in element 2. Only 
element 4 on ethics does not take this general 
approach. It would seem sensible to consider 
the approach of the guidelines in any revision 
of the proposed code. We suggest that the 
effectiveness of the China-Pakistan code to 
promote awareness and change behaviour 
would be significantly increased if it were 
reframed so that most elements specifically 
addressed its key audience: individual life 
science practitioners in academic, industry, 
or government settings. However, it is 
important that the elements of the code 
directed at research institutions and other 
entities are preserved, as they help 
underscore the role that organisational 
culture plays in reinforcing and 
strengthening professional norms and 
practices. 
 
It is also clear that some elements of the 
guidelines and the proposed code relate to 
the same issue: so element 1 of the code on 
Ethical standard covers the same topic as 
element 4 of the guidelines on Ethics; 
element 8 of the code on Education covers 
the same issue as element 2 of the guidelines 
on Education; element 9 of the code on 
Awareness and engagement covers the same 
element 3 of the guidelines on Awareness 
and engagement; element 10 of the code on 
International exchanges covers the same 
issue as element 8 of the guidelines on 
Exchange of information. While it is not quite 
so easy to see just from the titles, there are 
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CHINA PAKISTAN CODE 
Element 1: Ethical standards 
Element 8: Education and training 
Element 9: Awareness and engagement 
Element 10: International exchanges 
Element 2: Research integrity 
Element 4: Process management 
Element 7: Institution’s role 
HAGUE GUIDELINES 
Element 4: Ethics 
Element 2: Education 
Element 3: Awareness and engagement 
Element 8: Exchange of information 
Element 5: Safety and security 
Element 7: Oversight 
Element 6: Accountability 
also commonalities between element 2 of the 
code on Research integrity and element 5 of 
the guidelines on Safety and security, 
between element 4 of the code on Process 
management for science research and 
element 7 of guidelines on Oversight and also 
between element 7 of the code on 
Institution’s role and element 6 of the 
guidelines on Accountability. These 
corresponding elements are set out in Table 8. 
 




These commonalities are to be expected in 
the closely related fields of chemistry and the 
life sciences. There are also elements in which 
the code and the guidelines differ, and again 
these are understandable. The guidelines 
start with element 1 on Sustainability and 
must relate to concerns about achieving the 
UN Development Goals without despoiling 
the environment with dangerous chemicals. 
Safely achieving these goals is just as 
important in regards to the life sciences, but 
element 3 of the code on Respect for the 
object of research relates to the more likely 
possibility of life scientists being involved in 
research on animals and human beings. The 
code also has two more elements than the 
guidelines and these two elements – 6 on the 
Popularisation of science and technology and 
5 on Constraint on the spread of research 
outcome – relate to the problem of both 
publicising the gains to society from scientific 
advances and preventing the misuse of such 
gains. 
Finally, it is clear from the diversity of codes 
under the BTWC put forward since 200549 
 
that it will not be easy to find agreement on 
the elements that should be in a code. One 
way that may help to decide what should be 
the elements might be to ask what would be 
the simplest way forward? For example, 
given that the OPCW has made important 
progress in developing, disseminating and 
promoting the Hague Ethical Guidelines and 
has resources available to foster further 
action, notably through its ABEO, and that 
there is a clear ongoing integration 
(convergence) of chemistry and the life 
sciences that will continue well into the 
future, it may be sensible for the aspirational 
code’s drafters and the BTWC States Parties 
more generally to consider the potential 
scope for synergy in the promotion of ethical 
guidance amongst the chemical and life 
science communities. This may be facilitated 
by examining how best to reinforce the 
common messages from both codes, which 
in turn may, in part, be aided by examining 
the possible structural alignment of the two 
codes by reordering certain elements of the 
proposed aspirational code so that they fit 
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Introduction: Annunciating the role and purpose of the Code in promoting respect for the 
BTWC 
Element 1: Ethical Standards 
Element 2: Education and training 
Element 3: Awareness and engagement 
Element 4: Respect for the object/subject of research 
Element 5: Research integrity 
Element 6: Process management for dual-use science research 
Element 7: Institution’s role/Oversight 
Element 8: International exchanges 
Element 9: Constraint on the spread of research 
Element 10: Popularisation of science and technology 
IAP STATEMENT 
1. Awareness 
2. Safety and Security 




3. Awareness and Engagement 
5. Safety and Security 





more closely to the order of the guidelines. 
The two extra elements of the code on 
information spread and constraint could then 
come at the end. The ordering of the 
elements of such a rearranged code is set out 
in Table 9. 
TABLE 9: A Rearrangement of the Elements of the Proposed Aspirational Code 
 
 
We also think that the position of education 
and awareness and engagement is well placed 
as elements 2 and 3 of the code as there is 
considerable later evidence that Australia 
(see Section 2) was completely correct in its 
2005 judgement that without systematic 
awareness-raising and extensive educational 
foundation no code is going to be effectively 
implemented and really affect the behaviour 
of people for the common good.50 
5.2 The Content (Wording) of the 
Elements of the Code 
 
Turning then to what might be the content 
of each of the elements in the code, it is easy 
to see that there is a very close resemblance 
in the elements of the IAP Statement on 
Biosecurity and the Hague Ethical 
Guidelines as shown in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Comparison of the Elements of the IAP Statement and the Hague 
Ethical Guidelines 
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So, the Hague Ethical Guidelines have the 
extra elements of Sustainability (1) and 
Ethics (4) and have separated Exchange of 
Information (8) from Education (2). The 
inclusion of Sustainability is understandable 
as the issue of sustainable development had 
loomed much larger in 2015 than in 2005, 
and the same might well be said in regard to 
Ethics. The wording of the common elements 
in the IAP Statement and the Hague 
Guidelines are set out in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Wording for the Common Elements of the IAP Statement and the 
Hague Guidelines 
 
The elements of the IAP Statement on Biosecurity are shown first with the Element shown 
in bold and the Element from the Hague Ethical Guidelines with the Element shown in 
italics. 
1. Awareness. Scientists have the obligation to do no harm. They should always 
take into consideration the reasonably foreseeable consequences of their 
own activities. They should, therefore: 
1) always bear in mind the potential consequences - possibly harmful - of 
their research and recognize that individual good conscience does not 
justify ignoring the possible misuse of their scientific endeavour; 
2) refuse to undertake research that has only harmful consequences for 
humankind. 
3. Awareness and Engagement Teachers, chemistry practitioners, and policymakers should 
be aware of the multiple uses of chemicals, specifically their use as chemical weapons 
or their precursors. They should promote the peaceful applications of chemicals and 
work to prevent any misuse of chemicals, scientific knowledge, tools and technologies, 
and any harmful or unethical developments in research and innovation. They should 
disseminate relevant information about national and international laws, regulations, 
policies and practices. 
2. Safety and Security. Scientists working with agents such as pathogenic 
organisms or dangerous toxins have a responsibility to use good, safe and 
secure laboratory procedures, whether codified by law or by common 
practice. 
5. Safety and Security Chemistry practitioners should promote the beneficial applications, 
uses, and development of science and technology while encouraging and maintaining a 
strong culture of safety, health, and security. 
3. Education and Information. Scientists should be aware of, disseminate and 
teach the national and international law and regulations, as well as policies 
and principles aimed at preventing the misuse of biological research. 
2 Education Formal and informal educational providers, enterprise, industry and civil 
society should cooperate to equip anybody working in chemistry and others with the 
necessary knowledge and tools to take responsibility for the benefit of humankind, the 
protection of the environment and to ensure relevant and meaningful engagement with 
the general public. 
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Given that all of this wording has already 
been widely accepted within the scientific 
community it would seem sensible to use 
such wording in the revised aspirational code 




We suggest that in the further discussions of 
the Aspirational (Ethical) Code under the 
BTWC and the development of the proposal 
by China and Pakistan it would be useful to 
consider the following ideas: 
 
1. All of the elements of the code should 
have wording (content) that is as short 
and concise as possible so that the whole 
code is easily understood and 
remembered by practicing scientists. 
 
2. The code should be introduced by a very 
concise statement of its purpose 
analogous to that used in the national 
code of conduct developed by the Royal 
Netherlands Academy of Arts and 
Sciences in 2008. 
3. As far as is possible, the elements of the 
code should focus on the ‘science 
practitioner’ in an analogous way to the 
way that the Hague Ethical Guidelines 
for the Chemical Weapons Convention 
focus on the ‘chemical practitioner.’ 
4. While it might be difficult to achieve a 
consensus on the elements of a universal 
biological security code and their 
contents, there is sufficient commonality 
in the elements and contents in the 
existing codes related to the BTWC for a 
compromise solution to be possible. 
5. Because of the continuing integration of 
the chemical and biological sciences the 
order of the elements of the aspirational 
code should be aligned as far as possible 
with the order of the comparable 
elements in the Hague Ethical Guidelines. 
6. In order to emphasise the necessity of 
regular, mandatory, certificated courses 
in biological security for all life science 
8. Exchange of Information Chemistry practitioners should promote the exchange of 
scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of 
chemistry for peaceful purposes. 
4. Accountability. Scientists who become aware of activities that violate the 
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention or international customary law 
should raise their concerns with appropriate people, authorities and 
agencies. 
6. Accountability Chemistry practitioners have a responsibility to ensure that chemicals, 
equipment and facilities are protected against theft and diversion and are not used for 
illegal, harmful or destructive purposes. These persons should be aware of applicable 
laws and regulations governing the manufacture and use of chemicals, and they should 
report any misuse of chemicals, scientific knowledge, equipment and facilities to the 
relevant authorities. 
5. Oversight. Scientists with responsibility for oversight of research or for 
evaluation of projects or publications should promote adherence to these 
principles by those under their control, supervision or evaluation. 
7. Oversight Chemistry practitioners who supervise others have the additional 
responsibility to ensure that chemicals, equipment and facilities are not used by those 
persons for illegal, harmful or destructive purposes. 
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practitioners to underpin the code, 
education and awareness-raising should 
be placed high on the order of the 
elements of the code just after the ethics 
element. 
 
7. Advantage should be taken of the fact 
that the wording in the IAP Biosecurity 
Statement and the Hague Ethical 
Guidelines is widely known within the 
scientific community to use the wording 
in these two documents where it is 
appropriate in the Aspiration (Ethical) 
Code under the BTWC. 
8. In order to facilitate the effective 
promulgation and consequent 
implementation of the proposed 
Aspirational (Ethical) Code under the 
BTWC, it is important to ensure that life 
science stakeholders are actively engaged 
in the process of the development of the 
code as in the participatory approach 
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Endnotes: 
*    The terminology traditionally used for codes 
is confusing as ‘code of conduct’ is sometimes 
used to cover different kinds of codes – 
aspirational, conduct and practice, and the 
particular type of code - of conduct - that gives 
guidance on appropriate behaviour in the 
workplace. We have sought to avoid confusion 
in the rest of this paper by using just the word 
‘code’ to cover codes in general and ‘code of 
conduct’ to refer only to codes that give 
guidance in the workplace. 
 
# For reasons explained in the paper, we describe 
this as an Aspirational (Ethical) Code similar to 
the Hippocratic Oath and the Hague Ethical 
Guidelines for chemists. 
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